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ABSTRACT 
 
            In this paper, I provide a specific channel through which financial development 
helps economic growth: by reducing the incidence of crises and making them less severe. 
To support this, I examine the various links among financial markets development, 
financial crisis, and GDP growth rate. My empirical estimates, using cross-country data 
from 1980 to 2007, show a statistically significant and economically relevant effect 
among these variables: countries with better local financial markets can largely decrease 
the frequency of occurrence of financial crisis, and that efficient banking systems can 
alleviate the adverse impact of banking crisis on output lost for the long-run, while better 
stock market can do it for the short-run. 
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                                                      CHAPTER I 
 
                                                  INTRODCUTION  
            Financial globalization has been the main trend of world economy since the 
collapse of Bretton Woods System. While financial globalization has been associated 
with high growth rates, increased investment, and a better ability to diversify risk in some 
countries, a number of other countries have experienced economic volatility because of 
significant financial crises over the same period. These developments have sparked a hot 
debate on the benefits of financial globalization.             
            At the initial stage, literature from such debate mainly focused on the direct 
relationship between financial globalization and economic output. The proponents of 
financial liberalization, such as Quinn (1997); Fischer (1998); Kraay (1998); Summers 
(2000); Donnell (2001); Edison, Klein, and Slok (2004), suggest the way in which 
financial globalization can benefit a country: financial globalization offers the 
opportunity to augment domestic savings, to relax borrowing constraints, to diversify 
away country-specific risk, to increase the investment, and to take the advantage of 
technology spillovers. Their opinions are based on the standard neoclassical framework 
which opines that it would generate welfare gains for both industrial countries with rich 
capital and developing countries with poor capital if capital could flow freely between 
them.1 However, with the deepening of financial integration came a spate of currency and 
banking crises since 1980s. A number of developed and developing countries have been 
hit by several serious financial and economic crises. The merits of international financial 
                                                 
1
 This is summarized by Kose, Prrasad, Rogoff and Wei (2006)   
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integration are also under forceful attack and doubt. Kaminsky and Reinhart (1998), 
Detragiache and Kunt (1998), and Glick and Hutchinson (2001), argue that financial 
globalization can increase the propensity to financial crises.2 Bhagwati (1998), Rodrik 
(1998), and Stiglitz (2002) argue that increasing capital account liberalization and 
unfettered capital flows are the important keys causing global financial stability. 
            However, literature in this stage has several disadvantages. First, most of the 
academic economists analyzed the effects of financial globalization just in a divided 
way—either positive or negative—rather than in a unified way, leading to a partial or a 
bias account on the effect of financial globalization. More importantly, although vast 
empirical literature has shown that GDP of the group of more financially open economies 
does grow at a more favorable rate than that of group of less financially open economies, 
or that financial liberalization increases the output volatility, it does not provide strong 
and robust evidence to establish the causal or direct relationship between globalization 
and economic growth and volatility.3 
            Therefore, at new stage of literature on such subject, academic economists 
develop an integrated framework to empirically quantify and contrast the positive and 
negative effect of financial globalization on economic growth. They found that the 
positive effect of financial globalization on growth by far outweighs the effect on 
volatility for the long run. For example, Ranciere, Tornell, and Westermann (2006) 
contrast experience of Thailand and India to support this assertion. Their finding is that 
“Although Thailand, a country with high financial liberalization, has experienced lending 
booms and crises, while India, a country with low financial liberalization, has followed a 
                                                 
2See Klein and Olivei (2006) for more detail. 
 
3This is concluded by Kose, Prrasad, Rogoff and Wei (2006), and they thus propose “threshold effect” 
which I will discuss later.     
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stable and save growth path, Thailand’s GDP per capital grew by 148% between 1980 
and 2001, while India’s GDP per capita grew by only 99%”. 
            By reviewing the existing literature, Kose, Prrasad, Rogoff and Wei (2006) 
concluded that there is no strong and robust evidence to establish the causal or direct 
relationship between globalization and economic growth and volatility. They propose 
“threshold effect”, including financial market development, institutional quality, 
governance, macroeconomic policies, and trade integration, to argue that globalization 
effects on domestic economy through the “threshold effect”. In other words, whether one 
country could reap benefit from globalization depends on how well its “threshold effect” 
is. Especially, more and more economists notice that the financial market development 
plays a crucial role in economy growth under the financial globalization. Using cross-
country data between 1975and 1995, Alfaro, Chanda, Kalemli (2003) show that the direct 
relationship between FDI and economic growth is not significant in their model, but once 
the financial market development, a interaction factor, is added into the model, the 
relationship becomes highly significant. That is, “FDI alone plays an ambiguous role in 
contributing to economic growth. However, countries with well-developed financial 
markets gain significantly from FDI.”4 Levine, Loayza, and Beck (1999) use the 
traditional cross-section, instrumental variable procedures and dynamic panel techniques 
to argue that “the exogenous components of financial markets development are positively 
associated with economic growth.” By analyzing the cross-border countries data over 
period 1986 to 1995, Klein and Olivei (2006) also show that “countries with open capital 
accounts over some part or all of these periods had a significantly greater increase in 
                                                 
4The percentage of FDI to GDP can be simply viewed as the financial openness degree. 
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financial markets development than countries with continuing capital account restrictions, 
and, over the twenty-year period, the developed financial markets make them enjoy 
greater economic growth.” 
            I conclude above: firstly, it is arbitrary to say that financial globalization can 
directly make countries enjoy the economic growth, or to blame that financial 
globalization is a hotbed of the financial crises. The effect of financial globalization on 
economy is realized through mechanism of “threshold effect”, especially the local 
financial markets development. Secondly, lots of existing literature just explored the role 
of local financial markets development in contributing to economic growth in a direct 
way. That is, it examines how a well-developed financial market helps a country to 
realize long-run GDP growth rate increase under the financial globalization.  
            The goal of my paper is not to perform another test of the direct effect of local 
financial market development on GDP growth rate. Instead, its main contribution is to 
provide an indirect perspective: If I can certificate that well-developed local financial 
markets can decrease the frequency of occurrence of financial crisis and alleviate the 
negative impact if financial crises occur, then, it can indirectly reflect that the role of 
local financial markets development is important in contributing to the economic growth.  
(See figure 1) 
    The asymmetric information theory, contagion theory (I will show these two 
theory in next chapter), and the paper of Joyce and Nabar(2008) provide motivation for 
my work. Joyce and Nabar argue that “in the absence of a banking crisis, a sudden stop 
event would not by itself have a significant on investment, which can alleviate the 
negative effect of capital flows on the economic volatility and stabilize the economic  
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growth for the long run.” The assumption their paper bases on is that a country with well-
developed local financial markets can avoid the banking crisis under the “sudden stop”.  
            To support my point, I examine the various links among financial markets 
development, financial crisis, and GDP grow rate. My empirical estimates, using cross-
country data from 1980 to 2007, show a statistically significant and economically 
relevant effect among these variables: countries with better local financial markets 
experience fewer financial crises, and that efficient banking systems can alleviate the 
adverse impact of banking crisis on output loss for the long-run, while a better stock 
market can do it for the short-run. 
            The rest of the paper is organized as follows: the underlying theory is reviewed in 
chapter 2; empirical methodology is presented in chapter 3; data are described in chapter 
4; regression results are discussed in chapter 5; and chapter 6 concludes.  
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                                                           CHAPTER II 
 
                                                 THEORICAL SUPPORT 
            My paper is going to examine whether well-developed financial markets can 
reduce the incidence of financial crises and alleviate their adverse effect. Below is a brief 
summary of several theories that show how local financial markets development works to 
decrease the financial volatility. 
             Asymmetric Information Theory. Asymmetric Information Theory is provided 
by Frederic S. Mishkin (1994, 1998) to describe the structure of the financial system and 
explore the theory of financial instability. He argues that “one of the reasons that using 
asymmetric information theory to understand the relationship between financial markets 
and financial crises is so attractive, is that this theory is able to clearly explain the basic 
facts about financial structure.”5 
            Asymmetric information, “a situation in which one party to a financial contract 
has much less accurate information than other party”, has been the problem of our 
economic activity. Specifically, asymmetric information will lead to both adverse 
selection and moral hazard in financial system. Mishkin defines adverse selection as “a 
problem that occurs before the transaction occurs when potential bad credit risks are the 
ones who most actively seek out a loan.” He describes that the “parties who are the most 
likely to produce an adverse outcome are most likely to be selected, which will make 
loans be bad credit risks.” Thus, lenders may decide not to provide any loans even though 
there are good credit risks in the market. In contrast, moral hazard is the problem that 
occurs after the transaction takes place. Mishkin explains that “moral hazard occurs 
                                                 
5For more detail, see “Preventing Financial Crises” by Mishkin 1994. 
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because a borrower has incentives to invest in projects with high risk in which the 
borrower does well if the project succeeds but the lender bears most of the loss if the 
project fails.” Moreover, the borrower may not work hard, uses the funds personally, or 
invests it into unprofitable projects. Thus, lenders would rather not make loans. 
            These problems impedes the efficient function of financial system to channel 
funds to individuals or firms who have the most productive investment opportunities, 
which will badly harm the investment and economic growth, and increase the financial 
volatility. More severely, Mishkin argues that adverse selection and moral hazard 
problems will become much worse when interest rate rise, uncertainty increases, bank 
panics happen, and stock market declines.6 If so, financial crises will occur. 
            Charles Wyplosz (1998) also points out the important role of adverse selection 
and moral hazard problems in leading to financial crises. He argues that “adverse 
selection implies a drying out of the market when risk is perceived to rise, which in turn 
my elicit dangerous behavior”--Financial crisis in Mexico in 1994 is a good case, and that 
“moral hazard leads to a variety of market failures as well as inappropriate policies, 
which lead to financial crises and aggravate their adverse effect.”  
            By the mainstream literature on banks, it is the asymmetric information problem 
that the existence of banks is justified. Firstly, banking systems and other financial 
intermediaries are experts at discriminating good from bad credit risks, and Mishkin 
argues that “financial intermediaries just make private loans that are not traded. As a 
                                                 
6
 Frederic S. Mishkin gives the explanation to this in his paper “ 
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result, investors are less able to free ride off financial intermediaries and bid up the prices 
of the loans.”7 
            Secondly, banking systems, compared with other financial intermediaries, are 
better in reducing asymmetric information by solving the moral hazard. Because, 
Mishkin explains, “banks’ advantages in information collection activities are enhanced 
by their ability to engage in long-term customer relationships and issue loans using lines 
of credit arrangements. In addition their ability to scrutinize the checking account 
balances of borrowers provides banks with an additional advantage in monitoring the 
borrowers’ behavior.”  
            Thirdly, using collateral is another important method for banks to reduce the 
adverse selection and moral hazard. If borrowers default on loans, the losses of lenders 
can be compensated by taking title and sell the collateral. Similarly, a well-developed 
stock market can prevent firms’ net worth from declining. The high net worth can also 
reduce the lender’s losses, if a firm defaults on its debt payments due to the poor 
investment. 
            In sum, the Asymmetric Information Theory suggests that efficient banking 
systems and a better stock market can reduce adverse selection and moral hazard 
problems, and hence reduce the incidence of financial crises and alleviate their adverse 
effects. 
            External shocks, Local financial markets, and Investment. As I have discussed 
above, local financial markets play an important role in discriminating good from bad 
                                                 
7In order to reduce asymmetric information, some people are willing to pay for the information. 
However, many other people not paying for information can still take advantage of information that others 
have paid for, leading to the “free-rider problem”. This suggests that, unlike the financial intermediaries, 
the private sale of information to solve adverse selection and moral hazard problems is so limited.  
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credit risks and channel funds to individuals or firms to promote the domestic investment 
by which they contribute to countries’ long run economic growth. Furthermore, it appears 
to be a significant factor in using foreign direct investment (FDI) and preventing the 
adverse effect of capital sudden stops under financial globalization. Much of the previous 
empirical work focusing on the impact of FDI on economic growth, like Alfaro, Chanda, 
Kalemli (2003, 2006), has shown the importance of well-developed financial 
intermediaries in taking advantage of those positive externalities of FDI, such as 
technology spillovers, productivity gains, managerial skills, and introduction of new 
processes. 
            In this part, I would like to review the research of Joyce and Nabar (2008) to 
show how well-developed financial intermediaries reduce negative externalities of FDI: 
the channels through which well-developed financial markets can alleviate the adverse 
effects of external crises, such as sudden stops, and of the financial crises caused by that 
shock, on a country’s investment and long run economic growth. 
The increasing role of FDI is the essential feature of financial integration. While 
FDI offers opportunity to countries to promote their economic growth, it also brings 
potential risk to countries’ economic volatility, especially to those countries who mainly 
rely on FDI and whose local financial markets are fragile. When external shocks (sudden 
stops) occur, Joyce and Nabar point out that there are “several channels through which 
sudden stops could potentially inflict serious long run economic costs on the domestic 
economy due to a fall in investment. Domestic investment may collapse following an 
external crisis if the supply of foreign funds for domestic investment dries up.” Local 
firms and industries may no longer have access to direct foreign funds since their credit-
worthiness declines. Because capital flowing to the local subsidiaries of multinational 
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corporations declines, those corporations’ ability to make domestic investment is 
impeded. If investment cannot recover quickly, countries’ long-run economic growth will 
be affected adversely. Joyce and Nabar give an example of East Asian countries that 
experienced the financial crisis in 1997. They find that because most of these countries’ 
investment did not bounce back soon, their output growth also fail to reach the pre-crisis 
average level quickly. 
Local financial markets play a crucial role in connecting external shock and 
investment collapses. Joyce and Nabar argue that if a country’s financial markets are 
fragile, banking sector crises will easily occur following the external crises. If so, “the 
allocation of resources and investment could be potentially more severely affected while 
the financial intermediaries clean up their balance sheets.” They point out that even if 
there are no external crises happening, the banking sectors crises alone can destroy the 
domestic investment. However, if the local financial markets are well-developed--in the 
absence of a banking crisis--“a sudden stop event would not by itself have a significant 
on investment, which can alleviate the negative effect of capital flows on the economic 
volatility and stabilize the economic growth for the long run.” 
Contagion Theory. Historical lessons tell us that financial crises are not limited 
by borders. Within a short period after flotation of the Thai baht in July 2, 1997, the 
financial crisis had spread to Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, and Philippines. Similarly, 
Hong Kong, Brazil, Mexico, and many other countries were quickly affected by the 
Russian crisis in 1998. The contagion theory is thus developed to describe and explain 
such phenomenon. Contagion is classified into two broad types—fundamentals-based 
contagion, used to describe shock that affect markets due to real and financial links and 
including common shock, trade linkages, and financial linkage, and investor-based 
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contagion, used to described the “process by which shocks that affect one market are 
transmitted to related markets despite the lack of actual fundamental relationships 
between the respective markets.” (Santor, 2002)  
Common shocks, such as a rise in world interest rates, a sharp decline in world 
aggregate demand, a large slowdown in commodity prices, or a significant change in 
exchange rate, may induce pressures and adverse effect of crises on currencies or stock 
markets of several countries simultaneously. Trade linkages can propagate currency crisis 
from one country to another. For instance, “currency contagion starts by a real 
depreciation of country A’s currency due to speculative attacks. Such depreciation 
enhances its export competitiveness and produces a trade deficit for its competitor 
country B. This result in a depletion of the foreign exchange reserves of country B and 
thus increase the probability of speculative attacks on country B’s currency.”8 For the 
financial linkages, Eric Santor (2002) argue that the negative effect of crises can be 
transmitted by undermining the quality of a bank’s loan portfolio through credit exposer, 
which leads to insolvency if credit risks are not well managed. Investor-based contagion 
can be explained by asymmetric information theory: if a crisis occurs in one country and 
generates fears of speculative attacks, it may induce financial markets’ participants to 
reassess other countries’ fundamentals and investors may expect to profit from 
speculation against currencies that they think other investors will also sell (Caramazza, 
Ricci, and Salgado, 2000). The behavior of investors during these periods is called 
“herding”. Since there exist imperfect information and collecting information is costly, 
investors have to follow those whose actions are thought to be “correct”. Such “herding” 
                                                 
8this example is cited from Eric Santor (2002) 
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behavior would induce asset price falls in the affected countries, thus undermining banks’ 
balance sheets and spread the crises.  
We can see that both types of contagion spread crises by affecting the local 
financial markets—currency market, stock market, and money market, which suggest that 
the local financial market condition plays a significant role in spreading crisis. Khalid and 
Kawai (2002) argue that “a country with weak financial market fundamentals is more 
likely to suffer from shocks elsewhere. Any speculative attack in another country will 
make this country more vulnerable to similar attacks.” Caramazza, Ricci, and Salgado 
(2000), investigating the relevance of external, domestic, and financial weaknesses as 
well as trade and financial linkages in inducing financial crises for 61 emerging markets 
and industrial countries, find that once the domestic and external fundamentals and trade 
spillovers are controlled, financial linkages and weaknesses play a significant role in 
spreading crises. Thus we can expect that well-developed financial markets are necessary 
for a country to avoid crises transmitted by other countries, and thus to reduce the 
incidence of financial crises.  
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CHAPTER III 
 
EMPIRICAL METHODOLOGY 
            The purpose of my empirical analysis is to test: 1) whether well-developed 
financial markets can reduce the incidence of financial crises; 2) whether, if financial 
crises occur, well-developed financial markets can alleviate their adverse effects on 
economic growth. The first test reflects the defense ability of local financial markets 
against financial crises, while the second test indicates the adjustment ability of local 
financial markets on the economies after financial crises occur. The reason I divide the 
empirical analysis into two parts is that we have to recognize that no matter how well the 
local financial markets development, it cannot totally eliminate the financial crises. 
Although some industrial countries have a high level of financial markets development, 
they also have suffered from financial crises, such as the examples of collapse of the 
Japanese asset price bubble in 1980s, three Scandinavian countries (Norway, Sweden and 
Finland) crisis in the late 1980s, and sub-prime mortgage crisis of U.S. in 2007.   
            For the first test, I use regression analysis to look at the direct effect of the level of 
local financial markets development on incidence of financial crises. This regression 
analysis uses data from 84 countries consisting of developed countries and emerging 
markets from 1980 to 2007 (Years of a small group of countries begin from 1982 or 1983 
because of absence of some data). The basic regression takes the form:  
                               INCIDENCEi = β0 + β1FINANCEi + β2Xi + εi                         (1) 
Where, INCIDENCEi is the number of times of a financial crisis including currency 
crisis, banking crisis, twin crisis, and debt crisis occurred in country i from 1980 to 2007, 
FINANCEi indicates country i’s average level of its local financial markets development 
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during this period (That is the variables of commercial-central bank assets, liquid liability 
of financial system, private sector credit, and bank credit which I will explain in next 
chapter.), Xi represents a vector of other control variables including average level of 
Financial Openness, Trade Openness during this period, the ratio of Governments 
Expense to GDP, as well as the GDP per capita and εi is an error term. 
            For the second test, I also use regression method to test the direct effect of the 
level of local financial markets development on difference of GDP growth rate between 
post-banking crisis and pre-banking crisis for occurred-year, short-term, and long-term. 
The data are from 45 countries consisting of developed countries and emerging markets 
from 1990 to 2004. The following equation is estimated: 
                            Gr.Dec.i = β0 + β1FINANCEi + β2Xi + εi                         (2) 
Where Gr.Dec.i (GDP growth rate decline) is difference of country i’s GDP growth rate 
between post-banking crisis and pre-banking crisis, which represents the impact of local 
banking crisis on its output (Here, I just use the data after banking crisis rather than other 
financial crises because, I have shown in last chapter, external or internal shock would 
finally lead to banking system crisis if local financial markets cannot avoid such shock. 
In addition, the change of GDP growth rate due to banking crisis can reflect more clearly 
about the direct function of domestic financial intermediaries to alleviate adverse effects 
on economic growth.), FINANCEi indicates country i’s level of its local financial 
markets development before the banking crisis occurred (in this test, these variables not 
only contain the bank-system variables-- bank assets, liquid liability of financial system, 
private sector credit, and bank credit, but also the stock market variables— valued trade, 
and capitalization, which I will explain in next chapter), Xi represents a vector of other 
control variables including the level of country i’s Financial Openness, Trade Openness, 
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the ratio of Governments Expense to GDP, Inflation Rate, Control of Corruption, 
Regulatory Ability, and Rule of Law before the banking crisis occurred,  and εi is a mean 
zero, constant variance disturbance term. 
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CHAPTER IV 
 
                  DATA 
            This chapter describes and explains the data used in the regression analysis. I 
collect information about 5 variables for 84 countries from 1980 to 2007 for test 1, and 
about 10 variables for 44countries from1990 to 2004 for test 2, including incidence of 
financial crises, the change of GDP growth rate, the level of local financial markets 
development, and some control variables. 
            Incidence, used as the dependent variable in test 1, represents the number of 
times a financial crisis occurred in each of the 84 countries from 1980 to 2007. The data 
are obtained from the IMF working paper of Laeven and Valencia (2008)—“Systemic 
Banking Crises: A New Database”, which reports a latest database on the timing of 
systemic financial crises including banking crisis, currency crisis, and sovereign debt9 
crisis. The database covers 161 countries for the period 1970-2007. I just select 84 
countries from it for the period 1980-2007 due to lack of other data of some countries and 
before 1980. 
            Gr.Dec., the dependent variable in test 2, is the decline of a country’s growth of 
real GDP per capita, due to a banking crisis; it measures the magnitude of the crisis. The 
GDP growth rate data come from Penn World Table 6.210. I test the impact of banking 
crisis on GDP growth rate change for three periods: the impact in occurred year—the 
GDP growth rate of the year in which the banking crisis occurred minus the average of 
                                                 
9In test 2, I get the data from the paper of Reinhart and Rogoff (2008)—“This Time Is Different”. 
10The Penn World Table “provides purchasing power parity and national income accounts converted to 
international prices for 188 countries for some or all of the years 1950-2004. The European Union or the 
OECD provides more detailed purchasing power and real product estimates for their countries and the 
World Bank makes current price estimates for most PWT countries at the GDP level.” 
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three years GDP growth rate prior to the banking crisis (The later term represents the 
level of GDP growth rate before the banking crisis occurred.), the short run impact—the 
average of two years GDP growth rate after banking crisis occurred minus the average of 
three years GDP growth rate prior to the banking crisis, and the long run impact—the 
average of five years GDP growth rate after banking crisis occurred minus the average of 
three years GDP growth rate prior to the banking crisis. In addition, the information of 
banking crisis is obtained from the paper of Reinhart and Rogoff (2008)—“This Time Is 
Different”.             
            Finance, the independent variable in both tests, is measured as the level of a 
country’s local financial markets development, including monetary market (banking 
system), and capital market (stock market)11—in test 1, it is the average of the level from 
1980 to 2007; in test 2, it is the level prior to the banking crisis. The accurate and 
comparable measures of level of the local financial markets development are very 
difficult to construct. I draw on such variables introduced by King and Levine (1993a), 
Levine and Zervos (1998), and Levine (2000). Alfaro et al. (2003) also follow these 
existing literatures to measure financial markets development, they argue that these 
variables can be classified into two broad categories: those concerning banking sector—
liquid liability of financial system (henceforth, LLY), commercial-central bank assets 
(henceforth, BTOT), private sector credit (henceforth, PRIVCR), and bank credit 
(henceforth, BANKCR), and those relating to stock market—valued trade (henceforth, 
SVALT), and capitalization (henceforth, SCAPT). Levine et al. (2000) explain these 
variables in their paper that they “would ideally like to construct measures of the ability 
                                                 
11In test 1, I just use the data about local monetary market because lots of countries did not realize stock 
market liberalization before 1990s.    
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of different financial systems to research and identify profitable ventures, monitor and 
control managers, ease risk management and facilitate resource mobilization. It is 
impossible, however, to construct accurate, comparable measures of these financial 
services.” Consequently, they use these indicators, but each of them, they argue, has 
particular strengths and weakness. 
            I obtain these six indicators from World Bank Financial Structure Database 
(2007)12. LLY: equals Liquid Liabilities (currency plus demand and interest-bearing 
liabilities of bank and financial intermediaries) divided by GDP. It is the broadest 
measure of the depth and size of financial intermediation, including central bank, deposit 
money bank, and other financial institution. Levine et al. (2000) point out the 
shortcomings of this variable. They assert that ‘it may not gauge the effectiveness of 
financial sector in ameliorating information asymmetries and easing transactions costs. 
Also, it includes deposits by one financial intermediary in another, which may involve 
‘double counting’”. This may be the reason that LLY is not significantly associated with 
the dependent variable in test 2, which is shown in next chapter. BTOT: equals the ratio 
of commercial bank assets divided by commercial bank plus central bank assets. This 
indicator measures the degree to which commercial banks allocate society’s saving. 
However, Levine et al. (2000) point out that it is not a direct measure of the quality and 
quantity of financial services provided by financial intermediaries, because “it does not 
directly measure the effectiveness of bank in researching firms, exerting corporate control, 
mobilizing saving, and easing transaction.” PRIVCR: equals the value of credit by 
financial intermediaries to the private sector divided by GDP. Levine et al. (2000) assert 
that it is the best indicator among these variables “because it improves on other measures 
                                                 
12
 The URL for the database is http://www.worldbank.org/research/projects/finstructure/database.htm. 
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of financial development used in the literature”. They argue that “this measure of 
financial development is more than a simple measure of financial sector size. It isolates 
credit issued to private sector, as opposed to credit issued to governments and public 
enterprises. Furthermore, it excludes credit issued by central bank”. This advantage 
avoids the ‘double counting’ problem of LLY. Moreover, they also argue that PRIVCR 
could, although not in a direct way, measure the amelioration information asymmetries. 
BANKCR: equals private credit by deposit money banks divided by GDP. It is similar 
with PRIVCR, but it does not include non-BANKCR to the private sector. Thus, it may 
be not comprehensive for some countries. SVALT (it equals stock market total value 
traded divided by GDP), and SCAPT (it equals stock market capitalization divided by 
GDP) are indicators about the liquidity and size of stock market. 
            Control Variables. The regression result may be affected by some other factors, 
such as the level of a country’s openness, government consumption, inflation rate, control 
of corruption, government regulation and policy ability, and rule of law, which are 
necessarily to be controlled in the tests.  
Although existing literature does not provide strong and robust evidence to 
establish the causal or direct relationship between globalization and economic growth and 
volatility, it does not necessarily imply there is no connection between them. Vast 
empirical literature has shown that financial crises of the group of more financially open 
economies are more than that of group of less financially open economies. So, the level 
of openness should be considered I consider two aspects of openness: the finance 
openness and trade openness. Finance openness equals the sum of FDI inflow and 
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outflow divided by GDP13. It may not be an accurate way to show the degree of finance 
openness, but considering FDI accounts for the largest part of capital flows, it can be 
simply viewed as the financial openness degree. The data for FDI flows are obtained 
from United Nations’  “WIR Annex Table” (2008).14 Trade openness equals import plus 
export and then divided by GDP. I collect the export and import data from Penn World 
Table 6.2. Existing literature, such as Calvo et al. (2004) and Frankel et al. (2005), show 
that trade openness can make countries less vulnerable to financial crises, and mitigate 
the costs of such crises if they do occur.     
I have shown in chapter 1 that it is the interaction between financial globalization 
and “threshold effect” that determines growth and volatility. Besides the development of 
local financial sectors, “threshold effect” also includes “improvements in institutions 
(defined broadly to include governance, the rule of law etc.), and better macroeconomic 
policies etc” (Kose, Prrasad, Rogoff and Wei 2006), which I should consider in the 
regression analysis: Control of Corruption plays a great role in affecting a country’s 
ability to attract and stabilize FDI flows by which a country can promote more domestic 
investment, facilitate its economic growth and decrease the output volatility. The 
corruption index in my tests comes from “Annual Report Transparency International”15; 
Regulation ability is an important key for a country’s government to prevent the country 
from crises under the financial integration. Kose et al. (2006) assert that premature 
opening of finance poses risk to crises when financial regulation and supervision are 
                                                 
13
 This method is introduced by Kose et al. (2006) 
14
 The most relevant time-series data from the WIR annex tables include selected FDI and cross-border    
M&A data. The URL for the database is 
http://www.unctad.org/Templates/Page.asp?intItemID=3277&lang=1 
15
 In test 2, this control variable represents the level of a country’s corruption which is prior to banking 
crisis. Such data of those counties in which banking crisis occurred before 1995 are substituted by 1995’s 
index, since the data are absent before 1995. 
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inadequate. Financial integration can intensify the capital flows which are channeled by 
excessive risks or weak fundamentals. In turns those premature capital inflows could 
have adverse effect on the health of financial institution in the event of adverse shocks. 
The data about government regulation and Rule of Law come from World Bank’s 
“Governance Matters—Worldwide Governance Indicators” (2008)16 
Other control variables are Government Expense of which data are from Penn 
World Table 6.2, and Inflation rate of which data are obtained from IMF’s “World 
Economic Outlook Database” (2008, Oct.)          
Finally, I have to note that the data of control variables in test 1 are the average 
value from 1980 to 2007, which give the outlook of these countries’ economy condition, 
while in test 2, I get these data of the year prior to banking crisis year, which show the 
local condition before banking crisis occurred.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
16
 The URL for the database is http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.asp 
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CHAPTER V 
 
    REGRESSION   RESULT 
                                                               Test 1 
            Test 1, with the sample size of 84 countries from 1980 to 2007, examines whether 
a well-developed local financial markets could decrease the incidence of financial crises 
under financial integration. Table 1 (A,B,C,D) reports the results that, at 5% significance 
level, all financial indicators (BTOT, LLY, BANKCR, and PRIVCR) turn out to be 
negatively and significantly associated with the incidence of financial crises (including 
banking crisis, currency crisis, and debt crisis). That is, the higher the level of a country’s 
local financial markets development (especially the banking systems, since the stock 
markets’ indicators are not counted in this test), the less the possibility of occurrence of 
financial crises in that country. The impact is quantitatively important. For example, a 
one standard deviation increase in PRIVCR could reduce a country’s incidence of 
financial crises by 0.4%. This result confirms those theories I have shown in chapter 2: A 
country with well developed local financial markets may decrease the incidence of 
financial crises, because well developed local financial markets help the country alleviate 
asymmetric information problem, reduce adverse selection and moral hazard, stand 
against the external shock (sudden stop and reversal of capital flows), and decrease 
probability of contagion due to financial crises occurred in other countries. Also, my 
regression result could support the finding of Husain, Mody and Rogoff (2005). They 
show that “emerging markets experience more banking or twin crises than do advanced 
or developing economies.” They explain that emerging markets, for the one hand, are 
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more exposed to financial integration, but for the other hand they have much weaker 
financial markets than advanced countries have.  
                                                            Test 2 
            Since it is hard to completely prevent financial crises no matter how well a 
country’s financial markets, test 2 examines whether a country with well-developed 
financial sectors could alleviate the adverse effect of financial crises on economic growth 
if crises occur.  
            Banking system. Table 2 (A-F) reports that a country’s GDP growth rate 
decreases for the long run after a banking crisis occurred (five years after). Table 2-A 
shows that, at 5% significance level, the PRIVCR indicator is negatively and significantly 
associated with GDP growth rate lose, while other tables (table 2-B,C,D) show that LLY, 
BTOT, and BANKCR are not. However, Levine et al. (2000) explain that each of those 
variables has its own shortcoming to measure the financial sectors development. For 
example, LLY “may not gauge the effectiveness of financial sector in ameliorating 
information asymmetries and easing transactions costs. Also, it includes deposits by one 
financial intermediary in another, which may involve ‘double counting’”. BTOT “is not a 
direct measure of the quality and quantity of financial services provided by financial 
intermediaries, because it does not directly measure the effectiveness of bank in 
researching firms, exerting corporate control, mobilizing saving, and easing transaction.” 
Compared with other financial sectors indicators, Levine et al. (2000) argue that PRIVCE 
is the best, “because it improves on other measures of financial development used in the 
literature”. They argue that “this measure of financial development is more than a simple 
measure of financial sector size. It isolates credit issued to private sector, as opposed to 
credit issued to governments and public enterprises. Furthermore, it excludes credit 
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issued by central bank”. Thus, this result could still show that, for the long run, the higher 
the level of a country’s banking systems development, the smaller the GDP growth rate 
loss due to the banking crisis. Since investment plays an important role in countries’ long 
run economic growth and well-developed banking system could reduce the adverse 
impact of external shock and local banking crisis on investment, the result is 
understandable and acceptable. To give a sense of the magnitude of the estimates, I make 
table 6 to show the change in GDP growth rate decline for the long run when Private 
sector credit (PRIVCR) changes by the difference between two countries’ PRIVCR. For 
example, the difference between UK’s PRIVCR (1.1158) and Indonesia’s PRIVCR 
(0.5120) is 0.6038, so the change in GDP growth rate decline for the long run for these 
two countries is 0.6038* -3.337=-2.01. It indicates that Indonesia suffered 2.01% more 
GDP growth rate decline during banking crisis than UK did due to their PRIVCR 
difference. However, table 3, for the short run impact (two years after), and table 4, for 
the impact of occurred year, report the results that all banking system indicators are not 
very significantly associated with GDP growth rate lose. Joyce and Nabar (2008) may be 
able to explain this result. They argue that GDP even could grow in the short run after 
crises occurred because net exports rise due to a currency devaluation. Calvo and 
Reinhart (2000), and Hutchison and Noy (2006) also point out that output could have a 
quick recovery after financial crises due to the net export. Although not significant, table 
3 and table 4 also indicate that the relationship between financial sectors variables and 
GDP growth rate lose is negative. That is, a well-developed banking system more or less 
could reduce the decline of GDP growth rate for the short run. 
            Stock market. Table 3-E,F show that stock market development is negatively and 
significantly associated with GDP growth rate lose for the short run in aftermath of 
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banking crisis, while table 2-E,F and table 4-E,F report that the relationship among them 
is not significant for the long run as well as in occurred year. There are some probable 
explanations for these results. Firstly, a well-developed stock market could decrease the 
incidence of herding behavior and speculative bubbles when crises occurred, which could 
delay the crises extension. Secondly, as shown in chapter 2, a well-developed stock 
market can prevent firms’ net worth from declining. The high net worth can reduce the 
lender’s losses, and hence prevent the domestic investment from declining sharply. 
Thirdly, SVALT and SCAPT are indicators about the liquidity and size of stock market. 
Levine and Zervos (1998) also find that stock market size is not robustly linked with long 
run GDP growth rate.    
            In addition, for test 2, I also try to add the square of finance indicator on the right 
hand side of equation 2. This will test if for very large financial markets relative to GDP 
the crisis can actually be very bad (worse than for intermediate levels). This consideration 
is motivated by the experience of Iceland during this crisis – their financial sector was 
huge and when the crisis hit, it took the whole economy down with it. However, I finally 
find that there does not seem to be a non-linear relationship. I will continue this study in 
future.  
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CHAPTER VI 
 
CONCLUSION 
            This paper studied the empirical relationship between various measures of local 
financial markets development and incidence of financial crises as well as GDP growth 
rate loss in the aftermath of a banking crisis. I find that countries with better local 
financial markets experience significantly fewer financial crises, and that efficient 
banking systems can alleviate the adverse impact of a banking crisis on output lost for the 
long-run, while better stock market can do it for the short-run. Basing on these results, I 
provide a specific channel to show that well-developed local financial markets play an 
important role in contributing to long-run economic growth under the financial 
globalization.   
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TABLES 
 
Table 1-A: The effect of the level of local financial markets development on    
incidence of financial crises — Liquid liability of financial system  
   (Significance At 5% Level; 84 Observations; R Square: 0.3469) 
  Coefficients 
Standard 
Error t Stat Mean 
Intercept 4.7047 0.5186 9.0725  
Liquid liability of 
financial system -2.7796 0.5353 -5.1923 0.4840 
FDI openness  -0.0988 0.0932 -1.0602 0.9304 
Trade Openness  -0.0075 0.0048 -1.5789 67.7920 
GOV.EX./GDP -0.0247 0.0190 -1.2979 20.6233 
GDP/CAPITA 6.3654 9.4292 0.6751 602319.9 
 
 
Table 1-B: The effect of the level of local financial markets development on    
incidence of financial crises — Commercial-central bank assets 
   (Significance At 5% Level; 84 Observations; R Square: 0.3426) 
  Coefficients 
Standard 
Error t Stat Mean 
Intercept 6.8463 0.7854 8.7159  
Commercial-
central bank assets -4.8701 0.9502 -5.1252 0.7891 
FDI openness  -0.0563 0.0955 -0.5902 0.9304 
Trade Openness  -0.0015 0.0051 -0.3034 67.7920 
GOV.EX./GDP -0.0303 0.0191 -1.5815 20.6233 
GDP/CAPITA 1.1013 9.4967 1.1596 602319.9 
 
 
Table 1-C: The effect of the level of local financial markets development on    
incidence of financial crises — Bank credit 
   (Significance At 5% Level; 84 Observations; R Square: 0.4475) 
  Coefficients 
Standard 
Error t Stat Mean 
Intercept 4.7204 0.4664 10.1189  
Bank credit -3.0428 0.4483 -6.7864 0.4032 
FDI openness  -0.0623 0.0862 -0.7231 0.9304 
Trade Openness  -0.0066 0.0043 -1.5133 67.7920 
GOV.EX./GDP -0.0364 0.0176 -2.0622 20.6233 
GDP/CAPITA 8.5100 8.6800 0.9809 602319.9 
 
  
32
Table 1-D: The effect of the level of local financial markets development on    
incidence of financial crises — Private sector credit 
   (Significance At 5% Level; 84 Observations; R Square: 0.4262) 
  Coefficients 
Standard 
Error t Stat Mean 
Intercept 4.7307 0.4778 9.9010  
private sector 
credit -2.6329 0.4089 -6.4390 0.4565 
FDI openness  -0.0344 0.0892 -0.3852 0.9304 
Trade Openness  -0.0076 0.0044 -1.6952 67.7920 
GOV.EX./GDP -0.0374 0.0180 -2.0747 20.6233 
GDP/CAPITA 1.1900 8.8700 1.3457 602319.9 
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Table 2-A: The long run effect of the level of local financial markets development on 
GDP growth rate loss due to banking crisis — Private sector credit (banking system) 
(Significance At 5% Level; 44 Observations; R Square: 0.3828) 
 
  Coefficients Standard Error t Stat Mean 
Intercept -4.2491 2.3311 -1.8227  
Private sector credit -3.3379 1.5189 -2.1976 0.4607 
GOV/GDP 0.0377 0.0707 0.5338 19.5002 
FDI openness 0.8715 0.7323 1.1899 0.6015 
Trade openness 0.0095 0.0107 0.8852 64.3827 
Corruption 0.3411 0.4215 0.8092 3.9527 
Inflation Rate 0.0379 0.0126 3.0086 22.7901 
Regulation 0.4320 1.0163 0.4250 0.3134 
RULE OF LAW 0.4826 1.0862 0.4443 0.0468 
 
 
 
 
Table 2-B: The long run effect of the level of local financial markets development on 
GDP growth rate loss due to banking crisis — Liquid liability of financial system 
(banking system) 
         (Significance At 5% Level; 44 Observations; R Square: 0.3078) 
 
  Coefficients Standard Error t Stat Mean 
Intercept -4.8924 2.6983 -1.8131  
Liquid liability of 
financial system -1.3477 1.8827 -0.7158 0.478817 
GOV/GDP 0.0207 0.0754 0.2743 19.5002 
FDI openness 0.6675 0.7766 0.8594 0.6015 
Trade openness 0.0076 0.0114 0.6658 64.3827 
Corruption 0.4060 0.4493 0.9035 3.9527 
Inflation Rate 0.0423 0.0132 3.1967 22.7901 
Regulation 0.3761 1.0777 0.3490 0.3134 
RULE OF LAW -0.3080 1.1381 -0.2706 0.0468 
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Table 2-C: The long run effect of the level of local financial markets development on 
GDP growth rate loss due to banking crisis — Commercial-central bank assets 
(banking system) 
(Significance At 5% Level; 44 Observations; R Square: 0.3015) 
 
   Coefficients Standard Error t Stat Mean 
Intercept -4.5572 3.7665 -1.2099  
Commercial-central 
bank assets 0.0198 0.0772 -0.4390 0.8406 
GOV/GDP 0.7903 0.7898 0.2570 19.5002 
FDI openness 0.0063 0.0113 1.0006 0.6015 
Trade openness 0.4608 0.4446 0.5629 64.3827 
Corruption 0.0435 0.0131 1.0364 3.9527 
Inflation Rate 0.5228 1.1088 3.3105 22.7901 
Regulation -0.6979 1.0047 0.4715 0.3134 
RULE OF LAW -1.4306 3.2585 -0.6947 0.0468 
        
 
 
 
 
Table 2-D: The long run effect of the level of local financial markets development on 
GDP growth rate loss due to banking crisis — Bank credit (banking system) 
(Significance At 5% Level; 44 Observations; R Square: 0.3612) 
 
  Coefficients Standard Error t Stat Mean 
Intercept -4.4187 2.3797 -1.8568  
Bank credit -3.0406 1.6294 -1.8660 0.4149 
GOV/GDP 0.0356 0.0719 0.4956 19.5002 
FDI openness 1.0494 0.7620 1.3771 0.6015 
Trade openness 0.0101 0.0110 0.9197 64.3827 
Corruption 0.2715 0.4372 0.6210 3.9527 
Inflation Rate 0.0400 0.0127 3.1458 22.7901 
Regulation 0.5075 1.0351 0.4903 0.3134 
RULE OF LAW 0.3097 1.1018 0.2811 0.0468 
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Table 2-E: The long run effect of the level of local financial markets development on 
GDP growth rate loss due to banking crisis — Valued trade (stock market) 
    (Significance At 5% Level; 44 Observations; R Square: 0.4749) 
 
  Coefficients Standard Error t Stat Mean 
Intercept -6.3289 2.0840 -3.0368  
Valued trade  -3.0338 1.6989 -1.7857 0.1332 
GOV/GDP 0.1015 0.0674 1.5056 19.5002 
FDI openness 0.8659 0.6439 1.3447 0.6015 
Trade openness 0.0118 0.0115 1.0268 64.3827 
Corruption 0.5613 0.3600 1.5591 3.9527 
Inflation Rate 0.0282 0.0109 2.5808 22.7901 
Regulation -1.1943 1.1359 -1.0514 0.3134 
RULE OF LAW -0.7494 0.8912 -0.8408 0.0468 
  
 
 
 
 
Table 2-F: The long run effect of the level of local financial markets development on 
GDP growth rate loss due to banking crisis — Valued trade (stock market) 
    (Significance At 5% Level; 44 Observations; R Square: 0.4709) 
 
  Coefficients Standard Error t Stat Mean 
Intercept -6.4001 2.0958 -3.0537  
Capitalization -1.8963 1.1052 -1.7158 0.3462 
GOV/GDP 0.1055 0.0677 1.5576 19.5002 
FDI openness 0.8970 0.6519 1.3759 0.6015 
Trade openness 0.0115 0.0116 0.9942 64.3827 
Corruption 0.6408 0.3561 1.7993 3.9527 
Inflation Rate 0.0259 0.0109 2.3594 22.7901 
Regulation -1.2531 1.1360 -1.1030 0.3134 
RULE OF LAW -0.7957 0.8911 -0.8929 0.0468 
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Table 3-A: The short run effect of the level of local financial markets development 
on GDP growth rate loss due to banking crisis — Private sector credit (banking system) 
(Significance At 5% Level; 44 Observations; R Square: 0.2300) 
  
  Coefficients Standard Error t Stat Mean 
Intercept -4.5543 3.2688 -1.3932  
Private sector credit -3.6905 2.1299 -1.7327 0.4606 
GOV/GDP 0.0340 0.0992 0.3428 19.5002 
FDI openness 0.8824 1.0269 0.8592 0.6015 
Trade openness 0.0171 0.0150 1.1386 64.3827 
Corruption -0.0558 0.5910 -0.0945 3.9527 
Inflation Rate 0.0328 0.0177 1.8530 22.7901 
Regulation 1.3774 1.4252 0.9664 0.3134 
RULE OF LAW 1.0968 1.5232 0.7200 0.0468 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3-B: The short run effect of the level of local financial markets development 
on GDP growth rate loss due to banking crisis — Liquid liability of financial system 
(banking system) 
(Significance At 5% Level; 44 Observations; R Square: 0.1644) 
 
  Coefficients Standard Error t Stat Mean 
Intercept -6.5499 3.7220 -1.7597  
Liquid liability of 
financial system 0.3225 2.5970 0.1241 0.4584 
GOV/GDP 0.0247 0.1040 0.2379 19.5002 
FDI openness 0.7350 1.0713 0.6860 0.6015 
Trade openness 0.0132 0.0157 0.8382 64.3827 
Corruption 0.0908 0.6198 0.1465 3.9527 
Inflation Rate 0.0397 0.0182 2.1772 22.7901 
Regulation 1.3675 1.4865 0.9199 0.3134 
RULE OF LAW -0.3003 1.5699 -0.1912 0.0468 
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Table 3-C: The short run effect of the level of local financial markets development 
on GDP growth rate loss due to banking crisis — Commercial-central bank assets 
(banking system) 
(Significance At 5% Level; 44 Observations; R Square: 0.1667) 
 
 
 
          
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3-D: The short run effect of the level of local financial markets development 
on GDP growth rate loss due to banking crisis — Bank credit (banking system) 
(Significance At 5% Level; 44 Observations; R Square: 0.1887) 
 
  Coefficients Standard Error t Stat Mean 
Intercept -5.2028 3.3669 -1.5452  
Bank credit -2.3806 2.3053 -1.0326 0.4149 
GOV/GDP 0.0291 0.1018 0.2864 19.5002 
FDI openness 0.9747 1.0781 0.9040 0.6015 
Trade openness 0.0166 0.0156 1.0637 64.3827 
Corruption -0.0713 0.6186 -0.1153 3.9527 
Inflation Rate 0.0363 0.0179 2.0182 22.7901 
Regulation 1.4310 1.4646 0.9770 0.3134 
RULE OF LAW 0.5808 1.5590 0.3725 0.0468 
 
 
             
 
 
 
 
  Coefficients Standard Error t Stat Mean 
Intercept -4.9620 5.1649 -0.9607  
Commercial-central 
bank assets -1.5073 4.4683 -0.3373 0.8405 
GOV/GDP 0.0146 0.1059 0.1381 19.5002 
FDI openness 0.7894 1.0830 0.7288 0.6015 
Trade openness 0.0136 0.0155 0.8810 64.3827 
Corruption 0.0765 0.6096 0.1255 3.9527 
Inflation Rate 0.0389 0.0180 2.1608 22.7901 
Regulation 1.4722 1.5205 0.9682 0.3134 
RULE OF LAW -0.2084 1.3777 -0.1513 0.0468 
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Table 3-E: The short run effect of the level of local financial markets development 
on GDP growth rate loss due to banking crisis — Valued trade (stock market) 
(Significance At 5% Level; 44 Observations; R Square: 0.2516) 
 
  Coefficients Standard Error t Stat Mean 
Intercept -6.4313 2.8522 -2.2548  
Valued trade -5.0468 2.3252 -2.1704 0.1332 
GOV/GDP 0.0740 0.0923 0.8013 19.5002 
FDI openness 0.9821 0.8813 1.1144 0.6015 
Trade openness 0.0246 0.0157 1.5636 64.3827 
Corruption 0.2178 0.4927 0.4421 3.9527 
Inflation Rate 0.0153 0.0150 1.0230 22.7901 
Regulation -0.4620 1.5546 -0.2972 0.3134 
RULE OF LAW -0.3772 1.2198 -0.3090 0.0468 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3-F: The short run effect of the level of local financial markets development 
on GDP growth rate loss due to banking crisis — Capitalization (stock market) 
(Significance At 5% Level; 44 Observations; R Square: 0.2517) 
 
  Coefficients Standard Error t Stat Mean 
Intercept -6.5705 2.8572 -2.2995  
Capitalization -3.2719 1.5067 -2.1715 0.3462 
GOV/GDP 0.0806 0.0923 0.8729 19.5002 
FDI openness 1.0516 0.8888 1.1831 0.6015 
Trade openness 0.0249 0.0158 1.5753 64.3827 
Corruption 0.3479 0.4855 0.7166 3.9527 
Inflation Rate 0.0113 0.0149 0.7586 22.7901 
Regulation -0.5431 1.5488 -0.3506 0.3134 
RULE OF LAW -0.4393 1.2148 -0.3616 0.0468 
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Table 4-A: The effect of the level of local financial markets development on GDP 
growth rate loss due to banking crisis in occurred year— Private sector credit 
(banking system) 
(Significance At 5% Level; 44 Observations; R Square: 0.2924) 
 
  Coefficients Standard Error t Stat Mean 
Intercept -1.2705 3.7440 -0.3393  
Private sector credit -2.1700 2.4395 -0.8895 0.4606 
GOV/GDP -0.0976 0.1136 -0.8591 19.5002 
FDI openness 2.4134 1.1762 2.0517 0.6015 
Trade openness 0.0325 0.0172 1.8865 64.3827 
Corruption -1.0302 0.6770 -1.5218 3.9527 
Inflation Rate 0.0243 0.0202 1.2007 22.7901 
Regulation 2.9466 1.6324 1.8050 0.3134 
RULE OF LAW 1.0016 1.7447 0.5741 0.0468 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4-B: The effect of the level of local financial markets development on GDP 
growth rate loss due to banking crisis in occurred year— Liquid liability of financial 
system (banking system) 
(Significance At 5% Level; 44 Observations; R Square: 0.2764) 
 
  Coefficients Standard Error t Stat Mean 
Intercept -2.3517 4.1381 -0.5682  
Liquid liability of 
financial system 0.0594 2.8873 0.0206 0.4584 
GOV/GDP -0.1037 0.1157 -0.8968 19.5002 
FDI openness 2.3211 1.1911 1.9487 0.6015 
Trade openness 0.0304 0.0175 1.7326 64.3827 
Corruption -0.9494 0.6891 -1.3775 3.9527 
Inflation Rate 0.0282 0.0203 1.3928 22.7901 
Regulation 2.9370 1.6527 1.7770 0.3134 
RULE OF LAW 0.2177 1.7454 0.1247 0.0468 
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Table 4-C: The effect of the level of local financial markets development on GDP 
growth rate loss due to banking crisis in occurred year— Commercial-central bank 
assets (banking system) 
(Significance At 5% Level; 44 Observations; R Square: 0.2784) 
 
  Coefficients Standard Error t Stat Mean 
Intercept -0.9129 5.7424 -0.1589  
Commercial-central 
bank assets -1.5487 4.9679 -0.3117 0.8405 
GOV/GDP -0.1127 0.1178 -0.9566 19.5002 
FDI openness 2.3887 1.2042 1.9836 0.6015 
Trade openness 0.0306 0.0172 1.7708 64.3827 
Corruption -0.9528 0.6778 -1.4056 3.9527 
Inflation Rate 0.0277 0.0200 1.3854 22.7901 
Regulation 3.0524 1.6906 1.8055 0.3134 
RULE OF LAW 0.2336 1.5317 0.1525 0.0468 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4-D: The effect of the level of local financial markets development on GDP 
growth rate loss due to banking crisis in occurred year— Bank credit (banking 
system) 
(Significance At 5% Level; 44 Observations; R Square: 0.2986) 
 
  Coefficients Standard Error t Stat Mean 
Intercept -1.0425 3.7403 -0.2787  
Bank credit -2.6966 2.5610 -1.0529 0.4149 
GOV/GDP -0.0971 0.1131 -0.8589 19.5002 
FDI openness 2.6058 1.1977 2.1755 0.6015 
Trade openness 0.0339 0.0173 1.9554 64.3827 
Corruption -1.1205 0.6872 -1.6305 3.9527 
Inflation Rate 0.0247 0.0199 1.2371 22.7901 
Regulation 3.0177 1.6270 1.8547 0.3134 
RULE OF LAW 1.1276 1.7319 0.6510 0.0468 
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Table 4-E: The effect of the level of local financial markets development on GDP 
growth rate loss due to banking crisis in occurred year— Valued trade (stock market) 
(Significance At 5% Level; 44 Observations; R Square: 0.2659) 
 
  Coefficients Standard Error t Stat Mean 
Intercept -2.3207 3.2739 -0.7088  
Valued trade -3.9653 2.6690 -1.4857 0.1332 
GOV/GDP -0.0388 0.1060 -0.3663 19.5002 
FDI openness 2.3699 1.0116 2.3426 0.6015 
Trade openness 0.0396 0.0181 2.1913 64.3827 
Corruption -0.8430 0.5655 -1.4905 3.9527 
Inflation Rate 0.0071 0.0172 0.4126 22.7901 
Regulation 1.0974 1.7844 0.6149 0.3134 
RULE OF LAW -0.0040 1.4001 -0.0029 0.0468 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4-F: The effect of the level of local financial markets development on GDP 
growth rate loss due to banking crisis in occurred year— Capitalization (stock market) 
(Significance At 5% Level; 44 Observations; R Square: 0.2510) 
 
  Coefficients Standard Error t Stat Mean 
Intercept -2.3646 3.3130 -0.7137  
Capitalization -2.2002 1.7471 -1.2593 0.3462 
GOV/GDP -0.0339 0.1070 -0.3175 19.5002 
FDI openness 2.3687 1.0306 2.2983 0.6015 
Trade openness 0.0374 0.0183 2.0388 64.3827 
Corruption -0.7338 0.5630 -1.3034 3.9527 
Inflation Rate 0.0041 0.0173 0.2402 22.7901 
Regulation 0.9802 1.7959 0.5458 0.3134 
RULE OF LAW -0.1002 1.4086 -0.0711 0.0468 
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Table 5: The correlation of the indicators of local financial markets 
 
  
Liquid 
liability of 
financial 
system 
Commercial-
central bank 
assets 
Private 
sector 
credit 
Bank 
credit 
Valued 
trade Capitalization 
Liquid liability of  
financial system 1      
Commercial-central 
bank assets 0.210396 1     
Private sector credit 0.766677 0.445054 1    
Bank credit 0.84968 0.428391 0.929122 1   
Valued trade 0.477458 0.259335 0.551607 0.584144 1  
Capitalization 0.576834 0.35168 0.62997 0.680084 0.941845 1 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 6:  
 
  INDONESIA COLOMBIA RUSSIA 
UK -2.01 -2.54 -3.47 
FRANCE -1.44 -1.94 -2.87 
 JAPAN -3.03 -4.53 -5.45 
 
This is the report of the change in GDP growth rate decline for the long run when Private sector credit 
(PRIVCR) changes by the difference between two countries’ PRIVCR. For example, the difference 
between UK’s PRIVCR (1.1158) and Indonesia’s PRIVCR (0.5120) is 0.6038, so the change in GDP 
growth rate decline for the long run for these two countries is 0.6038* -3.337=-2.01 
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